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Abstract— This paper investigates how to effectively stop an 
attacker from using compromised user credentials to gain 
authorized entry to systems that they are otherwise not 
authorised to access. The proposed solution extends previous 
work to move beyond a risk-based multi-factor authentication 
system. It adds a behavioural analytics component that uses 
keystroke dynamics to grant or deny users access. Given the 
increasing number of compromised user credential stores, we 
make the assumption that criminals already know the user 
credentials. Hence, to test our solution, users were given authentic 
user credentials and asked to login to our proof-of-concept. 
Despite the fact that all illegitimate users in our test cases were 
given the correct user credentials for legitimate users, none of 
these were granted access by the system. This demonstrates zero-
tolerance to false positives. The results demonstrate the 
uniqueness of keystroke dynamics and its use to prevent users 
with stolen credentials from accessing systems they are not 
authorized to access.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For some years now, user credentials have been one of the 
central mechanisms used to identify and verify that users of 
systems are exactly who they claim to be. User credentials have 
always been the main gate keeper for granting or denying 
users’ access to systems. It is not surprising therefore that over 
the past few years, there has been an increase in the number of 
attacks targeted at user credentials [15][20][31]. A report by 
Verizon reflects that user credential breaches have increased 
from 280 in 2014 to 990 in 2015 [16]. This is an increase of 
more than 300%. Lawless Research [20] report that in 2015 
there were approximately 800 breaches that exposed 169 
million user credential records in the United States of America 
alone. The study by Verizon also argues that breaches which 
compromised user credentials accounted for 63% of all 
breaches in 2015 [16]. This is more than half of all breaches 
discovered in 2015. More recently, some reports were 
circulating that 272.3 million user credentials have been stolen 
for Gmail, Hotmail and Yahoo mail [18]. Clearly, user 
credentials are the target and provide low-hanging fruits to 
attackers. However, the only mitigation strategy most 
companies respond with; is to force users to change their 
passwords and/or a move to enforce strong passwords – 
passwords with a variable mix of normal and special 
characters.  
Contrary to the move for dynamic and strong passwords, 
users often prefer to have few rarely changing weak passwords 
that are easy to remember Alshanketi et al. [17] for usability. 
Moreover, these are often re-used across multiple systems or 
services without any alterations [17][19][20]. Phishing and 
key-logger attacks are responsible for harvesting user 
credentials on an industrial scale. Hence, reports on a security 
breach that revealed Facebook’s founder to have used ‘dadada’ 
as a password for both Twitter and Pinterest accounts are not 
far-fetched [11] - [14]. Such a weak password could be brute-
forced in less than 25 seconds [14]. This might sound like an 
isolated incident. However, there are more of such cases. 
The ever increasing threat of stolen, weak and often re-used 
credentials has made systems to be vulnerable. Therefore, 
some researchers on one end argue that user credentials are 
becoming obsolete [21][28][30][31]. Some argue that despite 
countless research efforts to replace user credentials; their 
pervasiveness even today demonstrate their credibility [27] - 
[29]. The research efforts around user credentials have been 
impressive. But the results are disappointing [28]. Not only 
have researchers failed to get rid of user credentials, but they 
continue to multiply and are still widely used for verifying user 
authenticity although they are known to insecure. Therefore, 
some argue that user credentials are like ‘salt’ (‘salt’ is good 
when added in small quantities to something else, but cannot 
be consumed on its own) [27][32]. Given the pervasiveness of 
user credentials, it seems plausible to design new 
authentication systems around their limitations rather than 
trying to replace them [19][20]. Hence, this paper argues that 
user credentials on their own are no longer sufficient to secure 
systems as rightly pointed by other researchers [26][27]. 
Furthermore, this paper attempts to solve the rising problem 
of stolen, weak and often re-used user credentials. It answers 
the question on; how to stop an unauthorized user armed with 
the compromised credentials of an authorized user from 
accessing systems they are not authorized to access? This paper 
builds on a risk-based multi-factor authentication Dlamini et 
al. [23]; Stinegger et al. [32] and  Adam et al. [33] by adding 
behavioral analytics to authenticate users with other attributes 
beyond user credentials.  
The main contribution of this paper focuses in making use 
of behavioral analytics like contextual data and keystroke 
dynamics to authenticate users on top of their credentials. The 
proposed solution makes authentication decisions to deny or 
grant access based primarily on user behavior which is derived 
as the user enters their credentials over a period of time.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 
discusses related work. Section 3 presents the proposed model. 
Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes the paper 
and provides future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Despite user credentials’ many known weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities, they continue to dominate authentication 
mechanisms used by most systems. Potter [28] argues that user 
credentials are increasingly becoming insecure. However, the 
alternative solutions do not look promising. Unsurprisingly, the 
banking sector’s automatic teller machines (ATMs) are still 
reliant on a supposedly random four character personal 
identification number (PIN) and a plastic card with a chip or 
magnetic strip which could be cloned to authenticate clients for 
access to their money [28]. Somehow, the banking industry still 
believe that four random characters could keep safe people’s 
hard-earned money.  
Several researchers have tried to address the problem of 
stolen or weak user credentials to strengthen authentication 
systems using different approaches. For example, Kumar et al., 
[1]; and De Ru and Eloff [26] focus on keystroke dynamics that 
capture the typing patterns of users. This work classifies users 
into fast, moderate and slow groups [1]. De Ru and Eloff [26] 
capture the typing pattern of user credentials and store them in 
a typing template for use in authentication. However, Kumar et 
al., [1] and De Ru and Eloff [26] fail to acknowledge that at 
any particular point and time a user can fall into all three 
groups. This may depend on other external factors such as;  
 the expertise of the current user,  
 the knowledge of the target string being used as an 
authenticator,  
 the user’s emotional state and,  
 the session [6].  
Hence, the approach of Kumar et al., [1] and De Ru and 
Eloff [26] is associated with high false positives and false 
negative rates (FPR and FNR respectively). Table 1 below 
shows the difference between the two – i.e. false negatives and 
false positives. It shows that a false negative occurs when a 
legitimate user with correct credentials is denied access to a 
system that they are authorized to access. A false positive 
occurs when an illegitimate user with the correct user 
credentials is granted access to a system they are not authorized 
to access. Furthermore, the clusters therein are created from 
single key press in a typing session. The work fails to cater for 
a combination of key presses e.g. shift-A for capital letter A.  
The work of Haque et al., [2] authenticates users based on 
their habitual typing patterns and a target string. The authors 
use key press events such as dwell time (i.e. key press time), 
flight time (i.e. inter key press time), and the total time (i.e. 
session time) to perform classification and verification of users. 
Similar to Kumar et al., [1], the work of Haque et al., [2] also 
suffers from high FPR and FNR. For example, an authentic 
user might be flagged an imposter and denied access for just 
one incorrect character in the target string. Furthermore, this 
work fails to consider typographic errors yet this would have a 
huge impact on the flight and dwell times. For example, the use 
of delete and backspace keys in case of errors could easily 
render a legitimate user as an imposter. 
TABLE I 
FALSE NEGATIVES VS FALSE POSITIVES 
 Legitimate user 
with correct 
credential 
Illegitimate user 
with correct 
credentials 
Grant Access Allowed “False Positive” 
Deny Access “False Negative” Allowed 
 
Haque et al., [2] explore the dwell and flight time of a user’s 
typing patterns in a dynamic manner. This work adds a genuine 
acceptance rate (GAR) to quantify the acceptance of an 
authentic user. This is based on a user’s typing features falling 
within a certain threshold. Using a maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE), the authors claim a 92% success rate, 4% 
FPRs and 4% FNRs. However, this work Haque et al. [2] does 
not use the concept of clustering to detect outliers. The outlier 
detection algorithm computes a value and compares it to just 
one known list of points. This is not enough and it degrades the 
integrity of the results.  
On the contrary, Ali et al. [6] takes a different dimension 
and considers the different external factors that affect user’s 
typing behaviour. This work considers time, health conditions, 
emotional state and environment. However, Ali et al. [6] use 
statistical methods such as the mean and standard deviations. 
These often produce good results when given large samples. 
They fail to provide accurate results when the population size 
is small. Pisani et al. [10] proposes a system that uses multiple 
base classifiers (called ensemble) and adaptive algorithms.  
Hence, Pisani et al. [10] extends the work of Ali et al. [6] and 
overcome the challenges brought by change of typing 
behaviour due to time.  
Donozo, Ito and Nakakuni [4], propose a multi-modal 
behaviour analytics model that is based on a Pareto learning 
self-organizing map (PL SOM). The PL SOM is meant to 
improve the success rate and reduce FPR and FNR. However, 
it is difficult to determine a threshold and keep track of each 
user’s login attempt. Moreover, the size of a Pareto optimal set 
is large when compared to training and learned data. This 
makes the system to be heavy in memory and processing power 
usage [4]. Hence, the solution proposed in Dozono et al. [4] 
cannot be deployed in single-user devices such as mobile 
devices. 
Gurary et al. [5] implement a light-weight solution for 
mobile devices using keystroke dynamics. This work uses a 
soft keyboard for a touch screen. It focuses on the duration of 
a touch and the amount of time between consecutive touches. 
The authors added motion events instead of key press events. 
Additionally, Gurary et al. [5] shows some interesting results 
that are derived from K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN), binary 
decision trees and naïve Bayes models. These are used for 
classifying a new login request. The problem with this 
approach is that group instance points becomes a big cluster. 
Therefore, a login request from two users could result in a tie, 
an almost impossible stance for unique behavioural patterns. 
Alshanketi et al. [7] looks into the feasibility of using 
keystroke dynamics in small devices, with limited resources. 
This study  
 
 
 
includes both statistical and neural networks techniques. The 
neural networks’ results are better than the results of the 
statistical methods. Hence, this work shows a significant 
improvement on the FPRs. The authors use a random forest 
algorithm to improve the accuracy of the system. 
Dholi and Chaudhari [8] also propose the use of a K-NN 
which shows some improvement on the success rates, FPRs 
and FNRs. However, this work does not have any outlier 
detection algorithm to check the neighbouring clusters. Hence, 
any feature falling out of a potential cluster is immediately 
flagged as an impostor. Huran et al. [9] deviates from using a 
K-NN and uses a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) neural network. 
The MLP seems to work better in rejecting most impostors. 
However, it requires long training processes for large data sets.  
Existing literature makes a plausible attempt at using 
keystroke dynamics for authentication purposes. However, 
most of it fails to take into consideration other contextual data 
like geo-location, access device of login origin. These could be 
used to further increase success rates, and reduce FPRs and 
FNRs. The covered literature does not discuss how to mitigate 
the increasing threat posed by imposters with correct but stolen 
credentials. Furthermore, it also does not discuss the possibility 
of denying access and eventually locking out a legitimate user 
with the correct credentials but unusual keystroke dynamics.  
III. PROPOSED MODEL 
Figure 1 below depicts the proposed model. The model is 
first trained to learn the behavioural patterns of authentic users. 
A number of features are extracted during the training process 
and stored in a repository. These include session times, typing 
speed, keystroke combinations, pressure on the keys etc. The 
model learns more as users continuously make use of it. All 
successful attempts are added into the repository for the system 
to further learn and improve the accuracy of the results. The 
model has various phases as discussed below. 
 
 
 
A. Login Attempt 
The model uses traditional username and password for 
authentication. However, it adopts a two-step authentication 
process. The user types a username. If this is correct, the user 
subsequently types a password. This two-step authentication is 
beneficial because it makes it difficult for attackers to crack the 
system. An attacker will not even get to enter a password if 
they fail to enter the correct username. This approach could 
easily become a weakness if one considers an attacker with 
correct usernames which they know for sure are correct 
because of the first verification. The attackers’ only task would 
be to take each username and brute-force for the password. The 
authors acknowledge this limitation. However, the proposed 
solution requires that both username and password are entered 
manually without any auto complete. So a brute-force and 
dictionary attack would be an unsurmountable task to the 
attacker because they will have to manually type in each 
password. Furthermore, the more an attacker tries different 
password combinations; the more the system learns from their 
typing behaviour that they are actually not the authorized user 
from the behavioural partner and this way our solution could 
help profile the attackers before they are kicked out. The model 
extract keystroke features from the user as they type in their 
credentials. 
B. Feature Extraction 
As the user types in their credentials on login attempt, the 
model extracts keystroke features to create a user profile. This 
happens in real-time in the background. Currently, our model 
extracts the following features: 
- Typing rate 
- Timestamp 
- Left and Right Shift 
- Caps Lock  
Figure 1: Behavioural Keystroke Dynamics Authentication System model 
 
- Backspace 
- Delete 
- Geo-location 
- Keystroke latency 
- Keystroke pressure 
 
Collectively, these features are used to model and profile a 
user’s behavioural patterns. Existing literature seems to favour 
the use of keystroke latency and keystroke pressure for user 
authentication purposes. The proposed model also considers 
the two (i.e. keystroke latency and pressure) of every keystroke 
pressed is recorded within a login session. It then counts the 
feature set and measures the number of times a key is pressed. 
Furthermore, the model also captures and uses other contextual 
data like geo-location, time-zone etc. If used appropriately, 
such contextual data can help detect and proactively prevent 
unauthorized login attempts. All the captured data (i.e. feature 
extraction and contextual data) is then stored in a data store. 
C. Data Store 
Historical data that consists of successful login attempts is 
kept in a data store. The model autonomously learns new 
behavioral patterns and performs self-updates for each and 
every successful login attempt. The more successful login 
attempts a user makes, the more accurate the model would 
correctly classify and detect future login attempts. The 
historical data is drawn from the database during a login 
attempt and taken into the clustering process. 
D. Clustering 
Clustering is a good technique especially when dealing with 
big data. It helps to classify and categorize data according to 
small clusters. The purpose of the clustering process is to 
facilitate the work of the anomaly detection engine. The 
clustering process enables the proposed model to trace a user’s 
behavioral patterns at login. When tracing the behavioral 
patterns, the model performs anomaly detection on a subset of 
the data to reduce the computational costs. The model uses a k-
means clustering algorithm. This process also helps to increase 
the performance of the anomaly detection engine. The 
clustering algorithm is as shown below: 
1. Place k points into the space represented by the objects 
that are being clustered. (These points represent initial 
group centroids). 
2. Assign each object to the group that has the closest 
centroid. 
3. When all objects have been assigned, recalculate the 
positions of the k centroids. 
4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 until the centroids can no longer 
move. This produces a separation of the objects into 
groups from which the metric to be minimized can be 
calculated. 
There are various heuristics used to determine the value of 
k in the k-means algorithm. These include choosing k by 
visualisation or choosing k within a range or set. We picked the 
elbow method as our heuristic of choice, due to it being one of 
the tried and tested method for determining k [27]. 
E. Anomaly Detection Engine 
The anomaly detection engine takes input from a login 
attempt and clustered user data. It then assigns a risk level to 
the user. The anomaly detection part of the model comprises of 
three stages. These are global anomaly check, 
contextualization and local anomaly check. The next sub-
section discusses each of these stages in detail. 
1)  Global anomaly check: In the global anomaly check, the 
model checks for login attempts that are considered extreme 
anomalies. For example, an extreme anomaly would occur 
when a user who habitually uses a caps lock for capital letters 
but then starts to use a combination of shift and a letter. In the 
case that a user fails this global anomaly check, it would mean 
that their current login attempt deviates from their behavioural 
patterns. The user is then flagged as high risk. This is achieved 
by re-clustering historical data points from the current login 
attempt. The motivation behind re-clustering is that most 
clustering algorithms, specifically the k-means, are sensitive to 
outliers [24]. 
In the case that there exists an extreme anomaly point in the 
dataset, it is often placed in its own cluster. A login attempt 
being placed in its own cluster is a clear indication of an 
anomaly. All users that fail the global anomaly check are 
flagged as high risk. This does not necessarily imply that such 
users would be denied access. However, it means that extra 
caution must be given before they are granted access. This is 
enforced by the MFA engine which authenticates users based 
on their risk profile. Should it so happen that the global 
anomaly check is passed, the model moves to contextualization. 
2)  Contextualization: This phase contextualizes the 
observed login attempt for further analysis. It is implemented 
using a nearest centroid algorithm. This algorithm assesses and 
classifies each of the centroids of the k clusters to determine 
one that is most similar to the observed login attempt. 
Similarity is measured using an Euclidean distance as follows. 
Firstly, the model selects a cluster which best represents the 
observed login attempt. It then deduces whether the observed 
login attempt is an anomaly or not. The model then moves to 
determine the context of the login attempt. Once this is found, 
it is then fed into the stage on anomaly detection engine i.e. 
local anomaly check. 
3)  Local anomaly check: The local anomaly check 
performs further analysis using classical statistical techniques. 
This assigns a risk-level to the observed login attempt. The 
local anomaly check assesses whether a login attempt is an 
outlier or not. The first stage of the local anomaly check is 
focused on representing the respective distances between each 
member of the contextual cluster and its centroid. 
This entails retrieving the distances, arranging them in 
ascending order. When retrieving the distances and arranging 
them, it is important to avoid redundancy. This is because 
emphasis is placed on the distance value that is represented and 
not necessarily on how many times it appears.  
In the case that the Euclidean distance between the observed 
login attempt and the centroid is strictly greater than two 
specific thresholds, then the login attempt is flagged as an 
outlier. More specifically, if it is strictly greater than the first 
but less than the second threshold, the model refers to it as a 
first-degree outlier. However, if it is greater than or equal to 
the second threshold, it is referred to as a second-degree outlier. 
For example, failing a global anomaly check is considered as a 
second-degree outlier and it passes control to the MFA engine. 
F. Multi-Factor Authentication Engine 
The MFA engine assesses the authenticity and risk level of 
a user’s login attempt and applies the corresponding level of 
authentication measure. The MFA engine acts as a barrier of 
defence. Furthermore, it also allows for the model to learn from 
behavioral patterns. The engine has different levels of 
authentication measures, each corresponding to the risk-level 
of a user. The model uses following MFA mechanisms for the 
different risk-levels: 
1. First-Degree Outlier: One Time Password (OTP) 
2. Second-Degree Outlier: Out-of-Band Authentication 
(OOB) 
A first-degree outlier prompts the MFA engine to issue an 
OTP as an extra layer of defence on top of the correct user 
credentials. Once prompted for an OTP, the model then sends 
a temporary password to a remote device, more often, a cell-
phone or an email address. 
A second-degree outlier prompts the MFA engine to issue 
an OOB. An OOB is a relatively new authentication technique 
compared to OTP. OOB redirects authentication to a remote 
device. A user would for example be re-directed to authenticate 
on a different device. Once a user is authenticated; control is 
then passed back to the model. OOBs can help protect against 
man-in-the-browser attacks and many others. 
IV. RESULTS 
The experiment started by training the proposed model with 
login credentials of a group of authentic and authorized users. 
The users were asked to enter the login credentials for a 
number of rounds in order to train the model. The system made 
use of the session duration time and the typing speed to 
illustrate and demonstrate the practicability of the model. This 
is meant as a proof-of-concept experiment. This process started 
with a training set of instances clustered over a number of 
clusters. This is the data that goes into the data store. The model 
was then tested on a small sample of users to illustrate the point 
and its practicability. Our sample size of ten testing users is not 
in any way significant to draw conclusive results.  
Each of the users was given the login details of an authentic 
user on which the model was trained on initially. However, all 
login attempts of these unauthorized users’ with correct 
credential were flagged as anomalies and further denied access 
on their first attempt. Our solution only granted access to 
authentic users. Of the all the testing users, sixty percent failed 
the global anomaly check. The use of a mix of characters and 
numbers in the password field made it difficult for the users to 
traverse through the keyboard. This worked to our advantage. 
All the users were made aware of the extra barrier of security 
that uses behavioural analytics of keystrokes. However, they 
still were denied access. Figure 2 above illustrates an example 
of a login attempt that fails the global anomaly check. 
This particular user’s login attempt is shown at the right top 
corner of the x-y plot inside the red circle. This is too far from 
any of the clusters. Such login attempts require stringent MFA 
for they carry the highest risk. They trigger an OOB from the 
MFA. 
40 percent of the users that failed the local anomaly check. 
Even though these users’ login attempts failed to comply with 
correct behavioural patterns, they were not necessarily flagged 
as extreme anomalies. Figure 3 below illustrates a login 
attempt that failed the local anomaly check.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this figure, the cluster of context is cluster 1 and the 
centroid covers approximately a radius of 0.14. However, the 
user’s login attempt maintained a distance of 0.26 in the red 
circle. Existing models that uses behavioural keystroke 
dynamics would classify such an anomaly as a normal pattern. 
This is not the case with our model, as this is classified as an 
outlier. 
From the results, we can conclude that the proposed solution 
provides a plausible solution to solve the challenges posed by 
attackers using compromised user credentials to access 
systems they are not authorised to access. The model achieved 
its goal and successfully prevented unauthorised users with the 
correct user credentials from gaining access. The next section 
concludes the paper and provides directions for future work. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Most user credentials are already compromised or they soon 
will be. This paper illustrated the use of behavioral keystroke 
analytics to effectively deny unauthorized users with correct 
user credentials from accessing systems that they are not 
authorized to use. The proposed model proved to be effective 
and resilient. It denied access for all the unauthorized users 
without necessarily flagging for false positives or negatives. 
The results demonstrate the uniqueness of keystroke dynamics. 
In future, we plan to use continuous authentication to counter 
session hijacks. For performance issues, we will consider other 
measures of calculating the Euclidean distance. For robustness 
Figure 3: Failed Local Anomaly check 
Figure 2: Failed Global Anomaly check 
and improved accuracy; the solution needs more experiments with 
a large sample size of the training data of at least ten legitimate 
users instead of one and even more testing users.  
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